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Climate Duties, Human Rights and Historic Emissions
Derek Bell1
Abstract
The problem of global climate change cannot be resolved without the cooperation of both
China and the USA. However, neither government appears close to signing up to mandatory
emissions reductions. Both nations defend their climate policies by appealing to ideas of
fairness, equity and justice. This paper outlines the arguments offered by Chinese opponents
of mandatory emissions reductions, highlighting three central claims about historical
responsibility, ability to pay and the right to development. The first part of the paper
examines these claims, the arguments supporting them, the relationships among them and
their implications for a just global climate regime. Two different interpretations are
suggested – the ‘overlapping consensus’ account and the ‘hybrid’ account. It is argued that
only the hybrid account offers a coherent ethical position. The second part of the paper
critically examines the hybrid account of global climate justice. On this account, the
historical responsibility claim appears central to the Chinese argument that the West should
pay the costs of tackling climate change. Several arguments against the historical
responsibility claim are considered and detailed attention is paid to the argument from
excusable ignorance, which suggests that the West should not be held responsible for those
emissions generated before the risks of anthropogenic climate change were widely
recognised. It is argued that many of the common replies to the argument from excusable
ignorance are not convincing. However, a new (but limited) reply, which draws on the link
between basic human rights and energy use, is proposed. The final part of the paper shows
how the new reply requires a re-formulation of the hybrid account. The paper concludes by
considering the implications of this new account for a just global climate regime and, in
particular, China’s duties to contribute to it.

In 2007 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that:
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow
and ice and rising global average sea level (IPCC 2007: 30).
Global climate change has already happened. The IPCC has also become increasingly
confident about the causes of climate change:
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG [greenhouse
gas] concentrations (IPCC 2007: 39; original emphasis).
The IPCC defines an outcome that is ‘very likely’ as one that has an ‘assessed
probability of occurrence’ of more than 90% (IPCC 2007: 27). There is greater than 90%
probability that humans have caused global warming. The IPCC predict that:
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates would cause further warming and
induce many changes in the global climate system during the 21st century that would
very likely be larger than those observed during the 20th century (IPCC 2007: 45).
1
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If we continue with a business-as-usual emissions policy, we are ‘likely’ (=more than
66% probability of occurrence) to see global average temperature rises in the range of 1.7 –
6.4°C by the end of the 21st century (IPCC 2007: 45). The IPCC project that this will have
significant impacts on ecosystems and on humans. It is, for example, ‘likely’ that the
‘resilience of many ecosystems … [will] be exceeded this century’ (IPCC 2007: 48).
Similarly, there is ‘high confidence’ (= 8 out of 10 chance) that:
The health status of millions of people is projected to be affected through, for
example, increases in malnutrition; increased deaths, diseases and injury due to
extreme weather events; increased burden of diarrhoeal diseases; … and the altered
spatial distribution of some infectious diseases (IPCC 2007: 48).
We can expect that climate change will cause many people to die from malnutrition,
extreme weather events (including flooding, heat waves, wildfires and hurricanes), diarrhoeal
diseases, infectious diseases and lack of water. We can expect that the lives of billions of
other people will be seriously negatively affected by climate change. In short, human
emissions of GHGs will cause (and have already caused2) harm to other humans.
This has led some activists and philosophers to argue that we should conceive of
climate change as a human rights issue: we violate human rights by emitting greenhouse
gases. This contrasts sharply with the dominant cost-benefit analysis approach to assessing
how we should respond to climate change, which is used by economists. On the human
rights approach, we do not try to calculate the economic costs of death, injury, malnutrition,
water-stress or illness and then weigh them against the opportunity costs of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.3 Instead, we recognise human rights to life, physical security,
subsistence and health that should be protected from violation by human action. If
anthropogenic climate change threatens to violate these basic rights, each one of us has (at
least) a duty to pay his or her fair share of the costs of preventing anthropogenic climate
change.
The major problem for any theory of climate justice is to determine how the costs of
preventing anthropogenic climate change should be shared. What is a fair allocation of the
costs of preventing the harms of anthropogenic climate change? The Chinese Government,
like many others in the global South, has consistently argued that the global North should pay
the costs of climate change because they have caused the problem. It is the global North’s
historic greenhouse gas emissions that have caused anthropogenic climate change, therefore,
the global North should pay the costs of protecting people from the harmful effects of
anthropogenic climate change. The aim of this paper is to consider the role that historic
emissions should have in a theory of global climate justice. More specifically, I aim to
outline a distinctive approach to global climate justice – which is grounded in basic human
rights – and to consider the role that historic emissions should have in the proposed theory.
In section one, I offer a brief defence of the claim that anthropogenic climate change
violates basic human rights. In section two, I consider Onora O’Neill’s well-known objection
to rights-based theories of justice, namely, that they do not tell us how to allocate the
correlative duties. I consider a response to this objection and I distinguish three kinds of duty
that should be included in a full theory of climate duties. In the remaining sections of the
paper, I consider these three kinds of duty in more detail and in relation to historic emissions.
In section three, I consider (what I call) the ‘general climate duty’, namely, the duty to
promote effective institutions for the fair specification and allocation of particular climate
2
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duties. More specifically, I consider when this duty might have been first acquired by
citizens and states in the global North. In section four, I consider principles for specifying
and allocating climate duties under just (fair and effective) institutions. In particular, I
consider the claim that the global North should be held responsible for historic emissions
because its citizens have exceeded their equal per capita share of emission rights. In section
five, I outline an account of the duties of rectification that anyone who fails (or has failed) to
comply with the general climate duty should incur and I suggest that this has important
implications for how we think about arguments from historic responsibility. Section six
summarises the arguments of the paper.
1. Basic Human Rights
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has highlighted the
impact of climate change on human rights:
Global warming could result in hundreds of millions of people suffering from hunger,
malnutrition, water shortages, floods, droughts, heat stress, diseases triggered by
extreme weather events, loss of livelihood, and permanent displacement. Indeed,
climate change poses a direct threat to a wide range of universally recognized
fundamental rights, such as the rights to life, food, adequate housing, health and water
(United Nations 2007).
The suggestion is that climate change is a ‘direct threat’ to some of the most basic
human rights.
Similar arguments have been made by political philosophers writing on climate
change. For example, Henry Shue has argued that there is a human right to ‘physical
security’ and that this right is threatened by anthropogenic climate change (1999, p. 39).
Simon Caney has identified several human rights that are threatened by climate change,
including the right to life, the right to health, and the right to subsistence (Caney 2009).4
Caney has also argued, in other papers, that there is a human right ‘not to be exposed to
dangerous climate change’ (Caney 2008, p. 539; Caney 2006, p. 263). A similar climatespecific human right has been defended by Steve Vanderheiden, who suggests that:
Since rights exist in order to protect interests, a strong case can be made from the
critical importance to human welfare of climatic stability for a right to an adequate
environment with the corollary that the right includes a claim to climatic stability
(Vanderheiden 2008, p. 252).
Vanderheiden builds on Tim Hayward’s argument for a human ‘right to an
environment adequate for (human) health and well-being’ (Hayward 2005, p. 29).
Some of these accounts have appealed to widely recognized human rights, including
the rights to life, physical security, health and subsistence. Other accounts have defended
‘new’ climate-specific human rights. In this paper, I will focus on arguments that
anthropogenic climate change violates widely recognized – or basic – human rights. If
anthropogenic climate change violates basic human rights, we may not need to defend more
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controversial – or more ambitious – human rights claims to justify urgent action on climate
change.5
The most straightforward way of defending any particular human right is to show that
it has already been included in international human rights conventions. One attraction of this
approach is that rights that have been widely recognized in international law may be less
controversial than rights that have not been recognized in international law. Moreover, if we
begin from legally recognized human rights, we may be able to avoid offering moral
arguments to support our fundamental rights commitments. Basic human rights to life,
physical security, health and subsistence can be readily defended in this way by appealing to
major human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.6
However, the ‘legal’ approach to defending human rights is only a shortcut for most
moral and political philosophers. The legal recognition of a human right is ultimately
justified by a moral argument for that human right. Many different kinds of moral arguments
have been offered for particular human rights.7 However, basic human rights – including the
rights to life, physical security, subsistence and health – are often defended by appealing to
the interests that they protect:
Virtually any argument in favor of a right will depend at bottom on emphasizing that
the interest to which the right is asserted is genuinely important, fundamental, vital,
indispensable, etc. (Shue 1980, p. 8).
Basic human interests provide the grounds for basic human rights. We have seen that
human rights provide the strongest (moral) protection that we can offer, therefore, they must
be connected to our most important interests. As Griffin argues, in defence of his own
account of human rights:
I choose those features [autonomy and liberty among others] precisely because they
are important human interests. It is only because they are especially important
interests that rights can be derived from them; rights are strong protections, and so
require something especially valuable to attract protection (Griffin 2008, p. 35).
Similarly, ‘especially important’ human interests in life, physical security, subsistence
and health might reasonably be taken as grounds for basic human rights to life, physical
security, subsistence and health.8
The ‘important human interests’ argument provides a relatively straightforward way
of defending particular human rights. If we accept the argument for human rights to life,
5
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change’ (2006, pp. 259-64). See also Vanderheiden’s defence of the human rights to an adequate environment
and climatic stability (2008, p. 241).
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physical security, subsistence and health, it also seems a relatively straightforward step to the
claim that anthropogenic climate change violates – or threatens to violate – these human
rights. Caney has claimed that ‘it is clear that anthropogenic climate change violates [the
right to life]’ by, for example, increasing the frequency of extreme weather events, including
storm surges, which can be expected – based on previous experience – to cause ‘very high
mortality’ among the coastal population of Bangladesh (Caney 2009, p. 7). 9 As we saw
earlier, there is ample evidence in the latest IPCC reports to show that anthropogenic climate
change is likely to kill, injure, starve and cause illness to many millions of people. In short,
anthropogenic climate change will violate their human rights.
2. The General Duty and Particular Duties
Onora O’Neill has argued that the problem with rights-based theories is that they do not tell
us who has the duty to protect rights.10 O’Neill’s particular target is positive rights, such as
rights to welfare or education, because she assumes that we can specify the duties that are
correlative to negative rights, such as the right not to be killed or injured. However,
O’Neill’s concern about unspecified duties extends to negative rights when those rights can
be violated by the cumulative actions and collective practices – working through complex
causal chains – of many millions of people.11 In the context of anthropogenic climate change,
a human rights-based theory does not seem to tell us what we most need to know: Who has a
duty to do what? When do a person’s greenhouse gas emissions – or other actions – violate
the human rights of victims of anthropogenic climate change?
In reply to O’Neill’s concerns, Elizabeth Ashford has suggested that we can identify a
duty that is correlative to basic human rights – namely, the duty to promote and maintain
effective institutions that will fairly ‘specify and allocate’ the particular duties needed to
ensure the protection of basic human rights (Ashford 2007, p. 217). If we take human rights
seriously and we do not have clear and widely acknowledged criteria for specifying and
allocating correlative duties, then we should recognise a duty to promote and maintain
effective institutions that will fairly specify and allocate the duties needed to ensure the
protection of human rights. Let us call this the ‘general duty’. In the context of climate
change, we might recognise a ‘general climate duty’ – namely, the duty to promote and
maintain effective institutions that will fairly specify and allocate the particular duties needed
to ensure the protection of basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate
change. The general climate duty is implicit in the broader general duty once we recognise
anthropogenic climate change as a ‘standard threat’ to basic human rights (Shue 1980, p.
13).12
The main problem with both the general duty and the general climate duty is that they
still do not specify or allocate particular duties to individuals. Instead, they attempt to defer
the problem by requiring us to promote institutions that will solve the problem for us by fairly
specifying and allocating particular duties to individuals. However, the problem cannot be so
easily deferred for two reasons.

9

Caney quotes from – and bases his claims about the effects of storm surges on – McLean and Tysban (2001,
pp. 366-7).
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See, for example, O’Neill (1986, pp. 101-3; 1996, pp. 129-35).
11
Hayward has argued that the problem of unspecified duties extends to all negative rights, including, for
example, the right not to be tortured: ‘the circumstances under which a right not to be tortured is violated are not
brought about simply by numbers of individuals failing to recognize their negative duty, but rather are a result of
a systematic organization of power within which specific responsibilities are murkily dispersed’ (Hayward
2005, p. 53).
12
For a fuller discussion of the role of ‘standard threats’ in an account of human rights and correlative duties see
Bell (2009b).
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First, the duty to promote institutions that will fairly specify and allocate particular
duties to individuals might plausibly be re-described as a duty to promote just institutions.
The justice of institutions might be understood in two broad ways: substantively or
procedurally. If the justice of institutions is understood substantively, I can only fulfil my
duty to promote just institutions by promoting a particular substantive conception of justice.
However, a particular substantive conception of justice will be (or will entail) an account of
how particular rights and duties should be specified and allocated to individuals. In other
words, we can only fulfil our duty to promote (substantively) just institutions if we already
have an account of how particular duties should be specified and allocated to individuals. On
this understanding of justice, the general (climate) duty cannot be fulfilled unless we have a
prior account of (or principles for) the fair specification and allocation of particular duties.
We might be able to avoid this problem by adopting a procedural theory of just
institutions. If the justice of institutions is understood procedurally, I can fulfil my duty to
promote just institutions without promoting a substantive conception of justice. Instead, I
need only promote institutions that use just procedures to decide on substantive principles of
justice that will determine (or guide) the specification and allocation of particular duties to
individuals. So, for example, if I subscribe to a conception of procedural justice as
aggregative democracy, I need only promote the institutions of an aggregative democracy and
then ‘leave it to the people’ (or their representatives) to decide how particular duties should
be specified and allocated to individuals. On this account, the specification and allocation of
duties will be just if and only if the procedure is just.
However, there are two problems with adopting a purely procedural theory of justice
in this context. First, the most popular accounts of procedural justice in contemporary
political philosophy are deliberative rather than aggregative. So, I might be able to promote
the procedurally just institutions of deliberative democracy without promoting a substantive
conception of justice but I will not be able to be a good citizen in a deliberative democracy
without taking an active part in the debates about how particular duties should be specified
and allocated. In other words, even if we were to adopt a procedural theory of just
institutions, we would have a duty to try to work out how the particular duties that are
correlative to human rights should be specified and allocated by fair and effective institutions.
Second, our starting point was a commitment to (substantive) basic human rights. It seems
odd to adopt a purely procedural theory of justice for the specification and allocation of
particular duties to protect basic human rights, which have been specified (and allocated to all
humans) on substantive rather than procedural grounds. If we believe that substantive justice
is relevant to the specification and allocation of rights, why would we ignore it for the
allocation of the correlative duties?
I have suggested that the first reason that introducing the general (climate) duty does
not solve our initial problem is that it does not alleviate the need for a substantive theory that
specifies and allocates particular duties to individuals under fair and effective institutions.
The second problem with the general (climate) duty is that it produces an additional problem
of specification and allocation – namely, the problem of specifying and allocating the general
(climate) duty itself. If the promotion of fair and effective (or just) institutions is a collective
endeavour, we will need to work out what the duty to promote just institutions requires from
particular individuals at particular times and places. It is, for example, plausible that the
general duty requires different actions from President Obama than it does from the average
US citizen. Similarly, it might require different actions from the average UK citizen than it
does from a person living on less than a $1 per day in a developing nation. In other words, a
full account of the general (climate) duty will include an account of the fair specification and
allocation of the duty to promote just institutions. Moreover, the specification and allocation
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of the general (climate) duty cannot be purely procedural because it is logically prior to the
realisation of just institutions.
These important objections to the general (climate) duty might lead us to the
conclusion that we should look for an alternative response to O’Neill’s criticism of rightsbased theories. However, I think that would be premature. We have seen that the general
(climate) duty cannot offer a complete solution to the problem of identifying the duties that
are correlative to basic human rights. However, I want to suggest that it does offer us a
useful way of approaching the problem. The general (climate) duty suggests a particular
structure for an account of our particular duties.
We have seen that the general (climate) duty points us toward two sets of particular
duties that a complete theory of human rights-based duties will need to specify and allocate.
First, we need principles for the allocation of the duty to promote just institutions (i.e., fair
and effective institutions for the specification and allocation of duties). These principles will
tell us how to determine who should do what to promote just institutions. Second, we need
principles for the specification and allocation of particular duties (to protect basic human
rights) under fair and effective institutions. These principles will tell us who should do what
when we have just institutions to protect basic human rights.
In addition, a complete theory of human rights-based duties may need to specify
duties of rectification if our duty to promote just institutions is not fulfilled.13 So, the third
part of an account of human rights-based duties should include principles for the specification
and allocation of duties that arise from the failure of some people to comply with their
particular duties to promote just institutions. For example, if the failure of some of us to
comply with our duty to promote just institutions prevents or delays the development and
implementation of just institutions, we need to work out how (if at all) this affects the future
duties of both the compliers and the non-compliers.
In the remainder of this paper, I will consider how we might begin to develop these
three parts of an account of human rights-based duties in the particular context of climate
change. More specifically, I will consider the role and relevance of historic emissions in the
proposed account of climate duties. In section 3, I consider when we might first have
acquired the general climate duty. I relate this discussion to the claim that the global North
should pay the costs of anthropogenic climate change because it is morally culpable for its
historic emissions. In section 4, I consider one account of how climate duties should be
allocated under just institutions. I argue that we should reject the idea of a universal right to
equal emissions (or ‘equal emissions over time’) and, therefore, I suggest that all historic
emissions should not be counted equally. In section 5, I consider duties of rectification. I
outline some important duties of rectification and I suggest that it is the recent (historic)
emissions of the global North that are likely to generate the most significant duties.
3. Climate Duties 1: The Duty to Promote Fair and Effective Institutions.
On this account, the general duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the protection
of basic human rights is a duty that has existed for as long as human rights have existed.
However, the general climate duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the protection
of basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change may be better
understood as a newer duty. The basic human rights that are threatened by anthropogenic
climate change are not new human rights that have only come into existence with climate
13

We might also need principles to specify and allocate duties when some people do not comply with just (or
fair and effective) institutions. However, for institutions to qualify as ‘effective’, and therefore as ‘just’, they
must prevent large scale non-compliance. I will not address the problem of non-compliance under just
institutions in this paper. Instead, I make the simplifying assumption that we can make fair institutions effective
by designing appropriate penalties and punishments for non-compliance.
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change. They are basic human rights that can be violated in many different ways.
Anthropogenic climate change is a new threat – or a new way of violating – those rights.
Therefore, the original formulation of the basic human rights could not plausibly have
identified climate-related duties. This is a case where changes in ‘circumstances which were
not predicted … give rise to a new duty which was not predicted in advance’ (Raz 1986, p.
185). The duties that are correlative to basic human rights will change over time because the
‘typical major threats’ will change over time (Shue 1980, p. 33). Anthropogenic climate
change is a new way of violating basic human rights, which gives rise to new duties,
including a new general climate duty to promote fair and effective institutions for the
protection of basic human rights from the new threat posed by anthropogenic climate change.
This is a normal result of the ‘dynamic character’ of basic human rights (Raz 1986, p. 185).
I have suggested that the general climate duty is a relatively new duty but when did it
come into existence? More generally, we might ask: what factors are relevant to determining
when the general climate duty came into existence? I want to suggest that two factors are
important here.
First, we have seen that the general climate duty is a response to the new ‘standard
threat’ posed by anthropogenic climate change to basic human rights. Therefore, the general
climate duty cannot have come into existence before anthropogenic climate change posed a
‘standard threat’ to basic human rights. Two points of clarification are in order here. First,
we should distinguish between the time at which anthropogenic climate change became a
‘standard threat’ to basic human rights and the time at which humans could reasonably have
recognised anthropogenic climate change as a ‘standard threat’ to basic human rights. It is, at
least, possible that anthropogenic climate change posed a serious threat to basic human rights
before humans knew or could reasonably have been expected to know about it. Second, any
judgement about when anthropogenic climate change became a ‘standard threat’ to basic
human rights is likely to be contestable. However, it is clear from the evidence that
anthropogenic climate change should now be recognised a ‘standard threat’ to basic human
rights. We know that the effects of anthropogenic climate change have already violated the
basic human rights of some people and are likely to violate the basic human rights of many
millions of people in the near (and far) future.
It is less clear when anthropogenic climate change first posed a ‘standard threat’ to
basic human rights. Was it at the very beginning of the Industrial Revolution when humans
developed the capacity to emit large quantities of greenhouse gases? Was it early in the
twentieth century when the mass production of motor vehicles began? Was it shortly after
the Second World War when the global population exceeded 2.5 billion? Perhaps, the most
plausible way of approaching this question is to consider when the probability of
anthropogenic climate change causing widespread violations of basic human rights (and,
thereby, posing a ‘standard threat’) exceeded some threshold. So, for example, we might
imagine that the probability that humanity would take the route that it has taken since the
Industrial Revolution (e.g., the technological change, the population increases, and the social
and economic changes) may have been quite low so that the likelihood of anthropogenic
climate change violating basic human rights might also have been quite low. We might,
therefore, conclude that anthropogenic climate change did not pose a ‘standard threat’ to
basic human rights until more recently.
I have suggested that the first condition on the existence of the general climate duty is
that it cannot have come into existence until anthropogenic climate change posed a ‘standard
threat’ to basic human rights. The second condition is that the general climate duty – like all
duties – should not be unreasonably demanding. We might distinguish two ways in which
the general climate duty might be too demanding. First, the general climate duty might
require us to promote fair and effective institutions for tackling anthropogenic climate change
135

before we could reasonably be expected to know about anthropogenic climate change and its
effects. If at time t we are excusably ignorant of the effects of our use of fossil fuels, it seems
unreasonable either: at t to claim that we have the general climate duty; or at t+1 to claim that
we should be held morally responsible for our ‘non-compliance’ at t with the general climate
duty. So, the general climate duty can only be imputed to an agent that is either
knowledgeable or inexcusably ignorant about the link between fossil fuel use and the rightsviolating effects of anthropogenic climate change. Judgements about excusable ignorance
will, of course, be contestable. However, I think we might plausibly argue that most ordinary
citizens in the global North were excusably ignorant of the effects of fossil fuel use until (at
least) the mid 1980s. It might be possible to argue that Northern states had a much greater
responsibility to consider and conduct research into the effects of their actions (and the
actions of their citizens) and, therefore, that their ignorance became inexcusable much earlier.
The second way in which the general climate duty might be too demanding is that it
might ask people to sacrifice too much. The general climate duty asks us to make two kinds
of sacrifice. First, it asks us to pay the opportunity costs of devoting time to promoting just
institutions. In some circumstances, this might be too much to ask of an agent. For example,
a person living on less than a $1 a day has more urgent demands on their time, energy and
resources and the general climate duty should not be imputed to them. Second, the general
climate duty asks us to pay the opportunity costs of living under and complying with just
institutions (after they have been successfully promoted and implemented). If institutions are
genuinely just, they should not ask too much of individuals. Therefore, agents should be
willing to pay the opportunity costs of complying with just institutions. However, we should
note that the general climate duty focuses only on the promotion of fair and effective
institutions for the protection of basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic
climate change. There is a risk that if we try to develop ‘climate-specific’ institutions, we
may develop institutions that are not fair or just in a broader sense. It is, therefore, important
to locate any theory of climate justice – and especially climate duties – in a broader theory of
justice. We should not endorse institutions that specify and allocate duties in a way that
protects basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change but fails
to protect basic human rights from other threats (or causes any other kind of injustice).
In this section, I have discussed the general climate duty to promote fair and effective
institutions for the specification and allocation of particular duties to protect basic human
rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. In particular, I have
considered when the general climate duty should be understood to have come into existence –
or, when an agent might be said to acquire the general climate duty. I have argued that the
general climate duty could not have come into existence until the probability of
anthropogenic climate change violating basic human rights became significant. I have also
suggested that the general climate duty should only be imputed to an agent when: (a) that
agent has knowledge of or is inexcusably ignorant of the link between fossil fuel use and
rights-violating anthropogenic climate change; and (b) complying with the general climate
duty (and complying with the proposed just institutions) does not make unreasonable
demands on the agent.
This understanding of the ‘birth’ of the general climate duty is significant because it
poses an important obstacle to historic responsibility arguments. On one understanding of the
historic responsibility argument, Northern states and their citizens should pay the costs of
tackling anthropogenic climate change because they are morally responsible for the problem.
However, the proposed theory of human rights and duties suggests that only the current
generation of ordinary citizens in Northern states might be considered guilty of any climaterelated moral failure. The general climate duty cannot reasonably be imputed to ordinary
citizens before the mid-1980s. It might be possible to make an argument that Northern states
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acquired the general climate duty earlier but it seems unlikely that they acquired it before the
beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, the most ambitious arguments for historic
responsibility – grounded in moral responsibility or moral failure and extending back to the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution – should be rejected.
4. Climate Duties 2: The Specification and Allocation of Particular Duties Under Fair
and Effective Institutions.
I have argued that the general climate duty is a relatively new duty for ordinary citizens of the
global North. In this section, I want to consider how fair and effective institutions should
specify and allocate particular duties (to protect basic human rights from the threat posed by
anthropogenic climate change). In other words, what principles for the specification and
allocation of climate duties should people who comply with the general climate duty be
trying to promote? In particular, I want to consider the possibility that fair principles will
allocate climate duties based on historic emissions. We have already seen that there are good
reasons for thinking that the North’s moral failure with respect to climate change is relatively
recent. Therefore, if we want to allocate climate duties based on historic emissions (over a
longer period of history), we will need a different kind of argument to support that claim. In
this section, I will consider one important argument that has been offered to support the claim
that the allocation of particular climate duties should be proportionate to historic emissions.
The central claim of this argument is that there is a universal right to equal
greenhouse gas emissions irrespective of the time and place that a person lives. We might
call this ‘equal emissions’. Let us assume that we are seeking to promote fair and effective
institutions for the specification and allocation of climate duties at time t. If we accept equal
emissions, we will take into account the historic emissions of each person in allocating their
future emissions (to ensure that over their lifetime they do not exceed their ‘equal emissions’
allowance). Moreover, if we find that some persons have already emitted more than their
‘equal emissions’ allowance, we may reasonably require them to compensate others
(assuming that there is some commensurability between emissions permits and other ‘goods’)
by, for example, paying for adaptation.
There are several problems with ‘equal emissions’. 14 I want to highlight two
important problems. First, it is not at all clear why there should be a universal right to equal
emissions. We do not normally distribute particular resources – even newly discovered
resources – in an egalitarian manner (Beckerman and Pasek 1995). Indeed, there are very
few resources that are distributed equally in the contemporary world. Of course, we need not
endorse the distributive principles that appear to operate in (or between) contemporary (‘real
world’) societies (even so-called ‘liberal democratic’ societies). Instead, we might (and
probably should) adopt a more egalitarian theory of global justice.
However, the second problem with equal emissions is that there are good reasons for
advocates of egalitarian theories of global justice to support an unequal distribution of
emissions. I will suggest two reasons. First, different persons may need different resources
to achieve the same levels of welfare or realise the same capabilities. Emission permits are a
resource just like the fossil fuels that produce them. Some persons may need to use more
energy (and emit more greenhouse gases) than other persons to achieve the same level of
capabilities. If we are concerned about equality of (or, at least, sufficiency of) capabilities,
we may reasonably reject equal emissions. Second, circumstances may vary between
different times and places such that the marginal opportunity costs of not emitting greenhouse
gases vary considerably. This variation may be due to a range of factors, including, the
availability and cost of non-fossil fuel energy and the energy required to achieve a sufficient
14
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level of capabilities given the social, economic and technological structure of one’s society.
For example, it may be reasonable to suggest that current generations should not be entitled
to emit as much as previous generations because we have non-fossil fuel energy technology
available (or potentially available) to us at an affordable cost, which is consistent with
maintaining a sufficient level of capabilities. If the marginal opportunity cost for many
citizens in the global North of reducing our greenhouse gas emissions is lower than it is for
both previous generations in the North and for current generations in the global South, equal
emissions is not the most plausible interpretation of fairness (even for an egalitarian).
I have argued that we should reject equal emissions. If we reject equal emissions, we
cannot treat all emissions at all times and places equally. Therefore, we will need to be rather
more careful about how we take historic emissions into account in determining future
responsibilities to reduce emissions and pay the other costs of protecting basic human rights
from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate change. In particular, I have suggested that
one unit of emissions from the global North at the beginning of the twenty-first century
should not count equally with one unit of emissions from the global South at the same time or
with one unit of emissions from the global North at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The marginal opportunity cost – measured in an appropriate metric, such as impact on basic
capabilities – of reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be considered as well as the level
of historic emissions when we try to develop principles for the fair specification and
allocation of climate duties. In other words, historic emissions may be relevant in
determining the fair allocation of climate duties under just institutions but historic
‘subsistence emissions’ (with a high opportunity cost) should not be treated in the same way
as historic ‘luxury emissions’ (with a low opportunity cost) (Shue 1993).
5. Climate Duties 3: Duties of Rectification.
So far, I have discussed the general climate duty to promote just institutions and the
specification and allocation of climate duties under just institutions. In this section, I will
briefly discuss duties of rectification. The general climate duty assumes that the specification
and allocation of more specific duties must be done by effective institutions that aim to
protect basic human rights from the effects of anthropogenic climate change. This suggests
that we have no specific duties – for example, to limit our individual greenhouse gas
emissions – until there is ‘an actual [and “authoritative”] allocative scheme, operative and in
force’ (Feinberg 1984, p. 30). This is morally problematic because it suggests that we can
continue with ‘business-as-usual’ greenhouse gas emissions until there are fair effective
institutional regulations in place that specify the level at which we are required to limit our
emissions. This creates a perverse incentive for continuing non-compliance with the general
climate duty: if we don’t comply with the general climate duty and just institutions are not
created, we do not violate any human rights-based duties by continuing to emit high levels of
greenhouse gases.15 If we want to avoid this problem, we need to go beyond the general
climate duty.
I want to suggest two further duties that take us beyond the general climate duty. I
will argue that both duties follow from the general climate duty. First, we have a duty to
rectify the wrong that we have done if we fail to comply with the general climate duty. On
our account, if a person does not comply with the general climate duty, he violates the
correlative human rights. We generally recognise that if a person violates another person’s
human rights, they have a duty to rectify the wrong that they have done. 16 What does
rectification require in the context of the general climate duty? Let us assume that
15

We are, of course, violating human rights by not complying with the general duty to promote just institutions
for the protection of basic human rights from the threat posed by climate change.
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There may also be reason to punish them for the wrong that they have done.
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rectification cannot take place until just institutions are in place and duties are specified and
allocated. I would suggest that rectification requires that those who have not complied with
the general climate duty should be allocated more burdensome duties, including, for example,
lower limits on their future greenhouse gas emissions and a greater share of the monetary
costs of adaptation measures. The minimum requirement should be that they are not
advantaged over the course of their lifetime by their failure to comply with the general
climate duty. Moreover, non-compliers might legitimately be required to accept a worse
outcome if rectification (or compensation) of the situation of the victims of human rights
violations caused by anthropogenic climate change (who might have been protected but for
non-compliance with the general climate duty) requires it. In sum, the general climate duty
implies a duty of rectification: under effective institutions, previous non-compliers must
accept more burdensome duties that may make them worse off than they would have been if
they had always complied with the general climate duty.
The second duty that follows from the general climate duty is the duty not to accept
benefits that result from actions that violate someone’s human right. If there were full
compliance with the general climate duty, we might plausibly assume that effective
institutions for specifying and allocating duties to protect basic human rights from
anthropogenic climate change would quickly be implemented. Let us assume that some
people comply with the general climate duty but others do not and as a result just institutions
are not implemented. Some of the compliers may benefit from the delayed implementation
of just institutions if, for example, they have been enjoying a lifestyle dependent upon a
higher level of emissions than they would have been permitted under just institutions. We
might reasonably say that they are benefiting from the actions of the non-compliers. In other
words, they are benefiting from actions that violate human rights. It is, however, surely
wrong for someone who takes human rights seriously to accept benefits that result from
human rights violations. Therefore, I would suggest that the general climate duty also
implies a duty not to accept benefits that result from the failure of other people to comply
with the general duty.
What does this additional duty require? I would suggest that it requires each person:
(1) to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to a level that they can reasonably believe would
be consistent with the specification and allocation of duties by just institutions; and (2) to
accept that just institutions can legitimately take into account the historic emissions (and
other relevant actions) of those who have complied with the general climate duty (as well as
those who have not complied) during the period that just institutions were delayed by noncompliance. In other words, the duty not to accept benefits requires both individual action
now in advance of just institutions and compliance with institutions that (fairly and
effectively) specify and allocate duties ‘retrospectively’.
If this account of duties of rectification is plausible, the failure of Northern states and
Northern citizens to comply with the general climate duty over (at least) the last twenty or
thirty years has significant implications for their duties now and in the future. The North is
guilty of a moral failure in recent times and should seek to rectify that failure. Northern
citizens are not only required to comply with the general climate duty (and ‘do their bit’ to
promote just institutions) but are also required to limit their own current and future emissions
to a level that they can reasonably believe would be consistent with the specification and
allocation of duties by just institutions. Moreover, Northern citizens should be seeking to
promote just institutions that will demand a lot from them, including, compensation for the
excessive (unjust) emissions that they have emitted since they acquired the duty to promote
just institutions (to protect basic human rights from the threat posed by anthropogenic climate
change) in the late twentieth century. The demands on Northern states – and, therefore,
indirectly on their citizens – might be even greater if it can be successfully argued that
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Northern states were culpably ignorant of the threat posed by climate change to human rights
much earlier in the twentieth century.
6. Conclusion
I have discussed three kinds of climate duty. First, we have a general climate duty to
promote just institutions that will protect basic human rights from the threat posed by
anthropogenic climate change. I have suggested that a reasonable account of this duty
undermines one important argument – the argument from ‘moral failure’ – for taking all
historic emissions into account when we allocate climate duties. We cannot justifiably claim
that Northern citizens or Northern states should be held morally responsible for their historic
emissions prior to the time when they can reasonably be said to have acquired the general
climate duty. However, they can be held morally responsible for their failure to comply with
that duty since they acquired it. If we assume that Northern citizens only (directly) acquired
the general climate duty in the 1990s, we should regard their pre-1990s emissions very
differently from their emissions since the 1990s.
Second, we have a duty to comply with effective institutions that fairly specify and
allocate duties to protect human rights from the threat posed by climate change. I suggested
that one common argument for taking historic emissions into account when allocating climate
duties was based on the idea of a universal right to equal emissions. I offered two criticisms
of this argument. First, it is unclear why we should be egalitarians about greenhouse gas
emissions when we are not generally egalitarians about other resources. Second, I suggested
that egalitarianism about emissions ignores the difference between luxury and subsistence
emissions and, more generally, does not take into account the variation between the marginal
costs of emissions reductions (measured in a relevant metric, such as capabilities) for
different people in different places and at different times. Therefore, I have suggested that a
fair allocation of emissions (or emission permits) is not likely to be an equal allocation.
Instead, a fair allocation of emission permits should reflect the (marginal) opportunity costs
(measured in reduced capabilities) of not emitting greenhouse gases for particular individuals
in particular places at particular times.17
It is important to be clear about the limits of this argument. First, the criticisms of
‘equal emissions’ are not intended to show that historic emissions, including pre-1990
emissions, are irrelevant when we are designing just institutions for the specification and
allocation of climate duties. Instead, they suggest that most historic emissions should not be
counted equally with current and future emissions. So, a fair allocation of emission permits –
i.e., duties to limit emissions – and other particular climate duties under just institutions
should not be based on a principle of equal emissions over time. Second, ‘equal emissions’ is
not the only possible argument for taking historic emissions into account. For example, it is
commonly argued that Northern citizens should pay the costs of anthropogenic climate
change because they are benefiting from historic emissions. I have not addressed this (or
other) arguments for taking historic emissions into account in determining a fair allocation of
climate duties under just institutions. Therefore, there is much more work to be done to offer
a fully worked out account of the relevance and role of pre-1990s historic emissions in
principles for the fair allocation of climate duties.
The third kind of climate duty that we have identified is duties of rectification. I have
suggested that most Northern citizens do have duties to rectify their failure to comply with
the general climate duty (since they acquired it in the 1990s). These duties include a duty to
reduce their own emissions now to a level that they can reasonably believe is consistent with
the allocation of climate duties under just institutions. In addition, Northern citizens should –
17
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to comply with the general climate duty and the duties of rectification – be seeking to
promote a global climate regime and effective institutions that will make severe demands on
them. In particular, most Northern citizens should expect to be required under just
institutions to pay compensation for their unjust post-1990s emissions.
Climate change poses a very serious threat to basic human rights in the twenty-first
century and beyond. We have a duty to protect basic human rights from the threat posed by
anthropogenic climate change. In this paper, I have offered the outline of a distinctive
account of how we should understand our (correlative) climate duties. In particular, I have
explored the relevance and the role of historic emissions in the allocation of climate duties.
The Chinese Government, like many in the global South, has argued consistently that the
global North should be held responsible for the costs of climate change because it is their
historic emissions that have caused the problem. I have suggested that this claim should not
be accepted without further consideration and some refinement. Specifically, I have
suggested that the citizens of the global North do have a duty to pay compensation for our
excessive (unjust) emissions during the last twenty or thirty years. However, I have also
suggested that earlier emissions should not be treated in the same way. Earlier emissions
may be relevant for the allocation of climate duties under just institutions but they are not
relevant in the straightforward way that often seems to be assumed in climate justice debates.
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